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Poking Along in the Fast Lane on
the Information Super Highway:
Territorial-Based Jurisprudence in
a Technological World
Brian E. Daughdrill"
I.

INTRODUCTION

When Icarus slipped the surly bonds of Earth for the boundless
expanses of heaven, he suffered the limitation of wings made of wax.
Every school child knows the story of how, enamored with the power and
freedom of soaring with the gods, Icarus flew closer and closer to the sun
until its heat melted the wax and he fell into the sea.' Though he had
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1. The Icarian Sea is named after this mythological event.
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transcended the territorial boundaries of Earth, he was limited by the
man-created materials with which he escaped.
Today, Icarian adventurers slipping the bonds of a world defined by
territories and countries via their departure into cyberspace suffer a
similar limitation: The laws under which they make their escape were
propounded and fossilized when every action of man could be defined by
the real estate on which he existed. Personal jurisdictional analysis,
conflict of laws, and trademark infringement all suffer from this earthly
constraint, and Internet users must heed the cries of Daedalus2 to be
mindful of the jurisdictional limits that bound the boundless heavens.
Whether posting a website or choosing a domain name, careful thought
must be given to the market to be reached if the modern-day Icarus does
not want to have his technological wings clipped by a court in a foreign
jurisdiction to which he had no desire to submit.
Commercial adventurers must be acutely aware of flying "too close to
the sun" because the law regarding commercial websites is particularly
fractious with few courts completely agreeing on what constitutes
sufficient commercial activity so as to justify the assertion of personal
jurisdiction. Because a finding of personal jurisdiction so often resolves
what law a court will apply, the unwary traveler faces both jurisdiction
under a foreign court and judgment under that court's laws.
This Article will briefly review the evolution of jurisdictional analysis
via Internet contacts and then analyze the two distinct tests that have
evolved to evaluate Internet-based forum contacts with particular focus
given to an area increasingly taking center stage in Internet jurisprudence-trademark infringement.3 Finally, this Article will look at
established conflict-of-laws approaches and examine a basic flaw in those
approaches given the transnational disputes now coming before courts.
II.

THE INTERNET

The Internet is a conglomeration of networked computers spanning
almost 150 countries and every continent. The Internet was an
outgrowth of a military network, ARPANET, begun in the late 1960s to
enable defense contractors, the military, and institutions performing
defense-related research to communicate over redundant channels.

2. Icarus' father was imprisoned on the Isle of Crete by King Minos. Legend holds that
he built the wings for himself and his son because King Minos controlled the land and the
sea. As they took flight he cautioned his son to fly neither too low lest the dampness bring
him down nor too high lest the sun melt the wax. His son, as so often is the case, did not
heed his father's warnings.
3. It is ironic that a "review of the evolution" means case law that is less than five
years old and "modern" case law is case law from January 2000 and forward.
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Thus, the Internet has evolved into "'a unique and wholly new medium
of worldwide human communication.'" 4 Accessed by computers that
range in power from primitive, monochromatic home computers to
advanced super computers acting as host computers, the Internet
connects people from every walk of life.5 Participants in this "cyber
world" typically access the Internet through affiliation with either a
commercial host, a business, or a university. America Online, Inc., a
commercial host, reports more than 25 million subscribers,6 and it is
estimated that the overall number of Internet users exceeds 200
million.7
A variety of informational and commercial communication is available
via the Internet.' Individuals exist on the Internet through screen
names that are, essentially, complete cyber-identities. No authoritative
information about the addressee is generally available, and the party
may well "use an e-mail 'alias' or anonymous remailer."9 This anonymity encourages mischief: "[T]he caution ordinarily exercised in face-toface real space tends to recede in the world of anonymity and solitude
that one finds in front of computer terminals." ° Although e-mail
addresses are typically characterized as anonymous with no geographical
information, this author previously has suggested that even the
electronic address provides some geographical information in much the
same fashion a nondescript box at a United States Post Office still
identifies the town or region to which the mail is directed." Though
the user may remain anonymous, his host server cannot remain
unknown, and parties responding to e-mail know, or at least could know,
the geographic location of the main "post office"-AOL.com is located in
Virginia and Earthlink.com in California and Atlanta. The server
becomes the "cyber-domicile" 2 of the Internet user. Adjudication under

4. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,850 (1997) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,
844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
5. See Matthew Oetker, PersonalJurisdictionand the Internet, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 613,
620 (1999).
6. See Reuters Business Wire, America Online and Best Selections Sign Agreement in
New Luxury (visited Dec. 3, 2000) <http://www.businesswire.com>.
7. Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 913 (D. Or.
1999) (citing ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 832).
8. Reno, 521 U.S. at 851.
9. Id. at 855 n.20 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting ACLU,
929 F. Supp. at 845).
10. Matthew R. Burnstein, Note, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational
Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 83 (1996).
11. Brian E. Daughdrill, PersonalJurisdictionand the Internet: Waiting for the Other
Shoe to Drop on FirstAmendment Concerns, 51 MERCER L. REV. 919, 937 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Burnstein, supra note 10, at 97.
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this proposition could well lead to an admiralty-type issue, flags (or in
this case servers) of convenience picked because of the favorable laws of
the forum of the server.'3 This result is not unheard of in the United
States; one need look no further than Delaware and Florida, which are
frequently picked as states of incorporation because of their favorable
laws.
Methods of communication via the Internet include the abovediscussed e-mail, one-on-one real time communication through chat
rooms, distributed message databases such as listservs, 4 and website
publication. Most information from websites is transmitted "without
human intervention" via "packet switching" protocol. 5 A user basically
accesses files maintained in a remote host server. Once requested, these
files are broken into packets that are individually transmitted to the
user's computer through either the same pathway of computers or
through many different connections depending on the level of "traffic" on
the Internet. Once downloaded, these packets are reassembled into
recognizable form.' 6
Of the utmost importance in any Internet analysis is the recognition
that a web page 17 does not lurk in cyberspace waiting to pounce on an
unsuspecting user. Rather, the user must type the document's address
into her computer to retrieve it. Websites with infringing material are
not broadcast into a user's computer unbidden. Likewise, websites,
unlike national publications to which the Internet is so often compared,
are not already distributed to the forum. They do not exist in the forum,
absent the site's server or secondary server being located within the
forum, until they are dragged there by the user. The user generally
must seek them out and must deliberately request that they be
downloaded to her computer.' This affirmative act singularly distinguishes the Internet from all case law relating to personal jurisdiction
via publication in traditional print media, and close judicial scrutiny of
Internet contacts is necessary to avoid offending Due Process:

13. See id.
14. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
15. Id. at 832.
16. Id.
17. A web page is essentially an electronic document or series of documents that exist
on one or more servers in remote geographical locations. Id. at 836.
18. See id. at 837. The author acknowledges that traps exist when surfing the web.
These so-called "blind links," or links that prevent the user's return to the previous website
and instead cycle the user through different pages of the entrapping website, have only
recently made their way into case law and not in terms of the assertion of personal
jurisdiction. YourNetDating, LLC v. Mitchell, 88 F. Supp. 2d 870, 871 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
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While the Internet allows businesses to engage in international
remain "entitled to
communication and commerce, those businesses ...
the protection of the Due Process Clause, which mandates that
potential defendants be able 'to structure their primary conduct with
some minimum assurance as to where the conduct will and will not
render them liable.'' 19
Similar to 'the above-described web/print publication distinction
overlooked in traditional jurisdictional analysis is the use of open
listservs or systems that require no human intervention to accept the email address of a registrant. Unlike closed listservs, which more closely
resemble traditional mailing lists in which a human moderator
determines which addresses are accepted, open systems register the
incoming e-mail address automatically.2" This automatic, nondiscriminatory contact is simply not a valid basis for the proper assertion of
personal jurisdiction: "'[Plersonal jurisdiction surely cannot be based
solely on the ability of [users] to access the defendants' websites, for this
does not by itself show any persistent course of conduct by the defendants in the [forum].'" 21 Careful judicial screening of Internet contacts
is required to prevent our computers from subjecting us to the jurisdiction of a court in a forum with which only our computer has had a
relationship.22
Some courts have glossed over this distinction.23
Other courts, at least, are mindful of the admonition: "We do not believe
that the advent of advanced technology, say, as with the Internet, should
vitiate long-held and inviolate principles of federal court jurisdiction."24

19. Millennium Enters., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 914 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
20. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834.
21. Uncle Sam's Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Uncle Sam's Army Navy OutfittersManhattan, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 919, 922 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (quoting GTE New Media Servs.,
Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
22. See Daughdrill, supra note 11, at 941. "A publisher who installs the software to set
up a listserv might be reckless as to contacts with a forum (i.e., awareness of and a
disregard for the possibility of forum contacts), but mere awareness has not been the
standard used by the Supreme Court" in exercising personal jurisdiction. Id.
23. Publications Int'l, Ltd. v. Burke/Triolo, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1183 n.2 (N.D.
Ill. 2000). 'I tale judicial notice of the fact that the website also allows users to register
and become part of the mailing list to receive special offers. While not dispositive, this is
further indication that Burke was using its website to try and drum up business in
Illinois." Id. Despite taking judicial notice, the court made no effort to discover whether
defendant's listserv manually selected Illinois residents or whether it was an open listserv
that allowed residents from anywhere to register.
24. GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
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PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET

Whether general or specific, the assertion of personal jurisdiction by
a court is based on deliberate conduct by the foreign defendant over
whom the court is attempting to exercise jurisdiction. For general
personal jurisdiction to exist, the defendant's contacts with the forum
must be continuous and "so substantial and of such a nature as to justify
suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct
from those activities."" Specific jurisdiction, in contrast, is claimspecific, depending upon whether the foreign defendant has purposefully
availed himself of conducting beneficial activities within a forum so that
it is not unreasonable for the defendant to expect to be amenable to suit
arising out of those specific contacts.26
Though long fractured over what constitutes "purposeful availment,"' 7 courts appear to be in agreement that mere negligence, even
recklessness, as to forum activities is not enough. Foreign defendants
must take some affirmative step to avail themselves purposefully of the
benefits and protections of the forum's laws.29 In early Internet cases,
courts confused the availability of websites with presence in the forum
and readily found jurisdiction. In Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set,

Inc.,3 ° the court compared a website to catalogs distributed in the forum
and found that defendant "'demonstrated its readiness to initiate
telephone solicitation of Connecticut customers.' 31 Later courts refined
this analysis and developed two distinct tests-the "sliding scale" test
and the "effects test"-to discern "purposeful availment."
A.

Sliding Scale-Marketing to the Forum

Though not announced with the fanfare of an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court, an opinion announced by a district court in
Pennsylvania 2 has resounded with nearly the same force as a United
States Supreme Court decree. Adopted to some extent by virtually every

25. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
26. See id. at 319.
27. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
28. See id. at 112 ("[Alwareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the
product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the
stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum.").
29. Id.
30. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
31. Id. at 165 (quoting Welen Eng'g Co. v. Tomar Elecs., 672 F. Supp. 659, 664 (D.
Conn. 1987)).
32. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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court that has addressed the assertion of personal jurisdiction via
Internet contacts, the sliding scale test is the foundation of nearly every
Internet jurisdictional analysis.33
At one end of the scale are situations in which the defendant "clearly
does business over the Internet[,] ...
enters into contracts with residents
of a foreign jurisdiction," and knowingly and purposefully transmits files
over the Internet.34 On the opposite end of the scale are sites that are
termed "passive websites," ones that do little more than post information
accessible to users in a foreign jurisdiction.3 5 The middle of the scale,
the area that has spawned the largest amount of litigation, encompasses
"interactive [wiebsites where the user can exchange information with the
host," typically through an exchange of e-mails or other information not
directly resulting in a commercial transaction.36 Of critical importance
is the precise language used by the court in asserting personal jurisdiction wherein the court in Inset Systems, Inc. looked at "the level of
interactivity and the commercial nature of the exchange of information."3'7 "[Tihe critical issue for the court to analyze is the nature and
quality of commercial activity conducted by an entity over the Internet
in the forum state. " ' s
B.

Clarifying "Interactive"Websites

Though initially blurred with the fully commercial end of the scale by
courts addressing the middle area, courts today are much more precise
in analyzing what constitutes "interactive." Mere ability to exchange email with a user generally no longer will cause a website to be defined
as interactive. 9 Posting a printable order form that the user must
then mail or fax to the website creator using traditional methods is not
sufficient to trigger personal jurisdiction. 40 Posting a toll-free number
on the website, once held sufficient,4 ' isno longer.42 Even displayed

33. See generally id.
34. Id. at 1124.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Brown v. Geha-Werke GmbH, 69 F. Supp. 2d 770, 778 (D. S.C. 1999) (quoting
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997)).
39. But see Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D. D.C. 1998) (holding the website
was interactive because it was available 24 hours a day in the District and allowed users
to e-mail the publisher).
40. See Mink v. AAAA Dev., LLC, 190 F.3d 333,336-37 (5th Cir. 1999); Berthold Types
Ltd. v. European Mikrograf Corp., 102 F. Supp. 2d 928, 932 (N.D. Il.2000).
41. See Inset Sys., Inc., 937 F. Supp. at 165.
42. See Mink, 190 F.3d at 337.
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intent eventually to have the capacity to take online orders is no longer
sufficient when there is no evidence that this capacity actually has been
used.4 3
Several recent cases illustrate the trend to scrutinize more closely "the
commercial nature of the exchange of information" and the greater level
of sophistication exhibited by courts now confronted with the assertion
of jurisdiction via Internet contacts.44
In Uncle Sam's Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Uncle Sam's Army Navy
Outfitters-Manhattan,Inc.,45 the District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri carefully analyzed both what the website was capable of and
what the website actually did.46 Uncle Sam's Safari Outfitters, a
Missouri sporting goods store, brought suit in Missouri against a New
York competitor for trademark infringement via the New York competitor's website. The New York entity moved to dismiss, claiming the court
lacked personal jurisdiction.4 7 The court agreed but granted a transfer
of venue rather than a dismissal.4" The court implicitly labeled its
previous holding in Maritz v. Cybergold, Inc. 49 as a more liberal

imposition of jurisdiction" and refused to find jurisdiction on facts
quite similar to the facts it previously held sufficient in Maritz.5 '
In analyzing the New York defendant's contacts, the court found that
(1) defendant established a website featuring its retail name; (2) the
website was then currently under construction and no customer could
place online orders at that time; (3) the website currently provided a tollfree telephone number; (4) the website allowed viewing of merchandise
that could then be ordered over the provided number; (5) there had been
a total of seven telephone orders generated by the website, all from
customers within New York; and (6) the defendant had, since the
inception of litigation, placed a disclaimer on the website stating that

43. See Uncle Sam's Safari Outfitters, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 922-23 (declining
jurisdiction when the site was not yet operational but granting motion to transfer); but see
Maritz v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1331 (E.D. Mo.' 1996) (holding anticipation
of full commercial capacity was sufficient).
44. 96 F. Supp. 2d at 923.
45. 96 F. Supp. 2d 919 (E.D. Mo. 2000).
46. Id. at 922-25.
47. Id. at 920.
48. Id. at 925.
49. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
50. 96 F. Supp. at 921. ("Other circuits have taken a conservative view on imposing
jurisdiction by virtue of a web site.").
51. Id. at 925. The court did distinguish Maritz, stating that in Meritz defendant had
transmitted information into Missouri approximately 131 times. Id. at 924.
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the merchandise was not available for sale to customers in Missouri.52
The court held those facts were simply not sufficient to justify the
assertion of personal jurisdiction."
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois similarly
refused to find jurisdiction on what was, arguably, a very interactive
website. In Berthold 7ypes Ltd. v.EuropeanMikrografCorp.,5" a typeface marketer in Illinois sued a German corporation, its president, and
its American distributor for counterfeiting, trademark infringement,
false designation of origin, and deceptive trade and business practice.
The German corporation and its president moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.55 The court carefully reviewed defendants'
Internet-based contacts and held that, despite what previously would
have been called rampant interactivity, the contacts were insufficient for
the assertion of either general or specific jurisdiction.5 6
European Mikrograf's website provided customers with the ability to
download and print a document entitled "Software Update Service
Agreement," which then could be submitted via "snail" mail or facsimile
to the national dealership in the user's country of origin. Taking that
step allowed the user to download files from the website that contained
updates of defendants' software. The website also provided a feedback
forum for users to post suggestions to improve the software, a support
site including an FAQ section, a downloadable addendum to the software
manual, downloadable news briefs on the corporation's activities, and an
e-mail link to contact the German corporation.57 Despite this level of
interactivity, the court correctly focused on the "commercial nature of the
exchange of information" and concluded that the German entity made
"4no commercial response to customer's submissions."" The court
further rejected Berthold's argument that defendant "targeted"
Illinois,59 holding the regular commercial activities of defendant did not
demonstrate an effort to "specifically target" Illinois customers. 0

52. Id.at 923 (discounting the import of the disclaimer because actions are measured
at the point of commencement of the suit).
53. Id. at 925.
54. 102 F. Supp. 2d 928 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
55. Id. at 929.
56. Id. at 934.
57. Id. at 930.
58. Id. at 933.
59. For a more thorough discussion of the "targeting" or "effects" test, see Section II(C)
infra.
60. 102 F. Supp. 2d at 933; but see PublicationsInt'l Ltd., 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1182-83
(finding a website that allowed the user to order a catalogue was on the commercial end
of the scale even though the user could not order merchandise from the website).
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This analysis can be carried too far. An example of over-analysis of
web activity is found in a New Jersey District Court case. In Amberson
Holdings LLC v. Westside Story Newspaper,61 the court shrugged off the
analysis of the decision in CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson2 and held
that posting a website on a New Jersey server, along with regularly
transmitting electronic files to that server, was insufficient to justify the
imposition of personal jurisdiction for trademark infringement in New
Jersey."
In Amberson Holdings the copyright holder of the musical Westside
Story sued a California domiciliary for its publication of a weekly
newspaper and its registration of the domain name "westsidestory.com"
with a New Jersey host server.6 4 The court granted the Californian's
motion to dismiss, holding the contact with the New Jersey host server
amounted to little more than a contract that, by itself, was insufficient
to trigger personal jurisdiction.65 The court refused to assert jurisdiction despite evidence that defendant (1) maintained a contractual
relationship with a New Jersey server; (2) represented that the data
making up the website was physically located in New Jersey; (3)
affirmatively arranged for that forum-based server to respond to all
requests for access to the website; (4) continuously communicated and
interacted with visitors to the website; and (5) regularly transmitted
electronic files into New Jersey to establish and update the website.66
The court, in its effort to follow the court in Mink v. AAAA Development LLC 67 that followed the court in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v.
Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.68 ("Zippo"), appeared to ignore the precedent on

which the sliding scale was constructed.6 9 In Zippo the court held that
on one end of the sliding scale were those defendants who "clearly
conduct business over the Internet" involving the "knowing and repeated
transmission of computer files over the Internet."" The court in Zippo
specifically cited CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,7 in which a Texas
defendant entered into an agreement with Ohio-based CompuServe and

61. 110 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D. N.J. 2000).
62. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). This case is considered one of the "ancient" Internet
cases.
63. 110 F. Supp. 2d at 335-37.
64. Id. at 333.
65. Id. at 337.
66. Id. at 335-37.
67. 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999).
68. 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
69. 110 F. Supp. 2d at 333-37.
70. 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
71. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
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repeatedly transmitted files to the Ohio-based server.12 The court in
CompuServe, Inc. noted that defendant entered into an ongoing
relationship with an Ohio-based company, sent software there for a
three-year period, and intended to continue the relationship.73 Under
those facts, the court in CompuServe, Inc. held, and the court in Zippo
agreed, via its approving citation, that the assertion of personal
jurisdiction was proper.7'4 Though the facts are distinguishable in that
defendant in CompuServe, Inc. was involved in litigation with the host
server, whereas in Amberson Holdings the suit was by the infringed
party, those facts do not explain the result. It was the act of transmitting the infringing material to the New Jersey server, not the contract,
that triggered the cause of action.
Despite the similarities in the case before it and the anchor case for
the standard from Zippo, the court in Amberson Holdings refused to look
at the repeated transmission of infringing files into New Jersey.7 5 It
instead held the use of the server was a mere contract with the forum
insufficient to trigger personal jurisdiction.7" In what amounted to a
complete abandonment of Internet precedent, the court stated, "It is
unreasonable that by utilizing a New Jersey server, defendants' [sic]
77
should have foreseen being haled into a New Jersey federal court."
This ultra-conservative decision, though a positive one for website
operators, has not been tested; given its August 2000 publication, it
remains to be seen whether other courts will follow this lead.
C. Effects Test-Aiming at the Forum
A second school of thought has developed in Internet personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence, apparently designed to overcome the
compartmentalized, commercialized focus of the sliding scale. First
propounded by the Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones,7" the so-called
"effects test" is now used to overcome Internet activity that, though
otherwise insufficient to sustain the assertion of personal jurisdiction on
the sliding scale, purposefully availed itself of the forum by deliberately
aiming the intentional misconduct at a forum plaintiff.

72. Id. at 1260-61.
73. Id. at 1261.
74. 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (citing CompuServe, Inc., 89 F.3d at 1264-66). It was the
CompuServe, Inc. wharf to which the court in Zippo tied one end of its sliding-scale ship.
75. 110 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 337.
78. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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In Calder the Court dealt with an extraterritorial tort aimed at the
forum that caused injury to resident plaintiff. The Court held that when
defendant "knew [the act] would have a potentially devastating impact
upon the [forum plaintiff]," 79 defendant "must 'reasonably anticipate
being haled into court" in the forum."0 Of critical importance in that
analysis was the prelitigation presence within the forum of the National
Enquirer,which is distributed to all fifty states. Unlike a website that
might or might not have been accessed in the forum, the National
Enquirer was regularly, deliberately sent to the forum (as well as the
other forty-nine states).8 1
Based on conduct that knowingly or reasonably could be expected to
cause injury within the forum, 2 the effects test is primarily focused on
the "'distinction between intentional and negligent wrongdoing for
purposes of assessing minimum contacts.'"8 3 "'Where intentional
misconduct is at issue, the wrongdoer should reasonably anticipate being
called to answer for its conduct wherever the results of that conduct are
felt.'"8 4 The effects test is normally "'associated with allegations
relating to intentional torts.'""5
The test has been used in Internet cases"' when intentional or
knowing Internet activity is targeted at a forum resident with knowledge
that the activity will harm the resident in the forum. 7 The effects
test's particular appeal is that it does not require a commercial
connection to the forum and appears to satisfy its "prelitigation forum
contact" with mere web presence. It should not be used for innocent
domain name infringement or infringing marks.
An example of innocent or negligent infringement illustrates this
principle. In Search Force, Inc. v. DataForceInternational,Inc.,8 s an
Indiana personnel recruitment corporation sued a Florida competitor,
DataForce, in an Indiana district court for trademark infringment.

79. Id. at 789.
80. Id. at 790 (quoting World.Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297).
81. Id. at 784.
82. See CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 780, 785 (D. Md. 2000).
83. Id. (quoting Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 95, 132 (E.D. N.Y. 2000)).
84. Id. (quoting Simon, 86 F. Supp. at 132).
85. Id. at 785-86 (quoting EFCO Corp. v. Aluma Sys., USA, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 816, 821
(S.D. Iowa 1997)).
86. See Bailey v. Turbine Design, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 790, 796 (W.D. Tenn. 2000)
(citing Panavision Int'l, LP v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998)).
87. See Millenium Enters., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 920 (holding the middle area of the
sliding scale from the court in Zippo needed further refinement to encompass deliberate
action purposefully directed at residents of the forum).
88. 112 F. Supp. 2d 771 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
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Search Force had conducted its services under the mark "DataForce"
since 1990 and registered its mark in 1999. DataForce was incorporated
in 1992 and conducted its services under the name "DataForce International." DataForce's sole contact with Indiana, other than its website,
was a 1998 advertisement for a position available in Indiana. In 1999,
alleging that the Florida corporation's activity had caused confusion in
the marketplace, Search Force brought suit in Indiana, and DataForce
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.8 9
In addressing personal jurisdiction via Internet contacts, the court
held that "the defendant's conduct [must be] evaluated to determine if
there is 'something more' to indicate that the defendant purposefully
(albeit electronically) directed his activity in a substantial way to the
forum."'O The "something more" must include activity that makes the
infringement "particularized to the forum state beyond the mere fact
that the forum state is the plaintiff's principal place of business."9" The
court refused to find personal jurisdiction proper because the marketplace confusion alleged by Search Force was not particularized to
Indiana nor specifically (intentionally) aimed at the forum. 92
Contrast Search Force with PanavisionInternationalLP v. Toeppen,93
cited by the court in Search Force, when the effects test was utilized to
find personal jurisdiction."4 Panavision brought suit against Toeppen
for cyberpiracy 9 after Panavision attempted to register its name as a
domain name. Upon discovering that "Panavision" was not available
because Toeppen had registered it (as well as over a hundred other
names including Delta, Neiman Marcus, Eddie Bauer, and Lufthansa),
Panavision's counsel sent a cease and desist letter to Toeppen. Toeppen
responded by offering both to sell the name to Panavision and to agree
"not [to] acquire any other Internet addresses which are alleged by
Panavision Corporation to be its property."96
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding of personal
jurisdiction based on the effects test, holding the purposeful availment
requirement is satisfied under the effects test.97 The court stated that
in the event of an intentional tort a corporation suffers the brunt of

89. Id. at 772-74.

90. Id. at 777 (quoting Panavision Int'l LP, 141 F.3d at 1321).
91. Id. (citing Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d at 419-20).
92. Id. at 780.
93. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
94. Id. at 1321-22.
95. This action was brought prior to the enaction of the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1999).
96. 141 F.3d at 1319.
97. Id. at 1322.
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harm in its principal place of business, which in this case is California,
and that Toeppen's intentional conduct designed to extort a buy-off from
Panavision injured Panavision in California "as he knew it likely
would."98
Between the two ends of the effects test-negligent or unintentional
tortious activity insufficient to justify assertion of jurisdiction and
deliberate cybersquatting or defamation-lies a middle ground that, like
the middle area of the sliding scale announced by the court in Zippo,
must be administered carefully. Although most courts have been
judicious with its use, the "sexiness" of the effects test or, perhaps, the
mere ease of application makes it an easy intellectual detour from the
thoughtful jurisprudence necessary to comport existing precedent with
the new technology. General commercial activity does not rise to the
deliberate, targeted. level, as noted by the court in Berthold Types Ltd.,
because the element of intent is missing.9 9 The court in Berthold Types
Ltd. eschewed the pitfall of confusing purposeful availment necessary to
sustain jurisdiction using the effects test with purposefully directed
commercial activity."' 0 By avoiding that trap, the court kept the
effects test of Calderjudiciously limited to intentional misconduct when
the second prong of the jurisdictional test-reasonable anticipation that
one's activities will result in being haled before a forum's court-is
clearly satisfied.'0 ' 0 2 Other courts have landed their decisions on both
sides of this issue.
In Millennium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP,'O' an
Oregon music retailer brought an action in Oregon against a South
Carolina retailer for trademark infringement. 4 The court thoroughly

98. Id.
99. See 102 F. Supp. 2d at 933.
100. Id.
101. The author has previously criticized the effects test from Calder as not com porting
with the technological differences between the Internet and national publications already
present within a forum. See Daughdrill, supra note 11, at 925. To the extent the test is
strictly limited in its application to situations wherein there is specific, intentional Internet
misconduct otherwise unreachable under the sliding scale analysis, such as cybersquatting
and knowing publication of intentionally defamatory material, in.conjunction with
prelitigation commercial contact, its use may rightly reflect what should be a reasonable
expectation of being haled into court in the forum at which the intentional act was aimed.
If courts use the test as an easy way out or to avoid the more sifting analysis required by
the extremely fact-sensitive sliding scale, the objection stands.
102. See Millenium Enters., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 907; cf. Euromarket Designs, Inc.
v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. II. 2000); Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson, 698
N.E.2d 816 (Ind.Ct. App. 1998).
103. 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or. 1999).
104. Id. at 909.
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analyzed case law on Internet personal jurisdiction and concluded the
assertion of jurisdiction was improper. 10 5 Specifically rejecting the
holding from Maritz, the court in Millennium Enterprisesstated that the
court in Maritz "did not examine whether any resident of the forum
actually had signed the mailing list or received information from the
defendant."' The court instead based its finding of jurisdiction on the
fact that the website could "'presumably includ[e] many residents of [the
forum].'" 0 7

The court in Millenium Enterprises blasted presumptions like this,
holding that "'[i]f such potentialities along [sic] were sufficient to confer
personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, any foreign corporation
with the potential to reach to do business with [forum] consumers by
telephone, television or mail would be subject to suit in [the
forum]." ' '
Thus, the court declined to adopt such a broad view of
personal jurisdiction.19 Although the court found that defendant's
website was arguably commercial because compact discs could be
purchased directly over the Internet, the lack of showing of an actual
forum purchase10 relegated the site into the middle category of
"interactive" when a showing of "something more" is required."'
While it was foreseeable that an Oregon resident might someday
purchase a compact disc from defendant, "foreseeability alone cannot
12
serve as the constitutional benchmark for personal jurisdiction."
"The foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum state.
Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connections with the
forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there."'

Contrast Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd.,
in
which an Illinois-based retailer of housewares sued an Irish retailer of
the same products in an Illinois district court alleging infringement of
105. Id. at 913-24.
106. Id. at 917 (emphasis added).
107. Id. (quoting Maritz, Inc., 947 F. Supp. at 1330).
108. Id. at 918 (quoting E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent Corp., 989 F. Supp. 173, 177 (D.
Conn. 1997)) (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 924.
110. For a complete discussion of an "actual forum purchase," see the discussion of
same under the analysis for Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp.
2d 824 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
111. 33 F. Supp. at 921.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297).
114. 96 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. Il1. 2000).
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Euromarket's thirty-five-plus-year
use of the trademark
"Crate&Barrel."" 5 Plaintiff maintained a websitel 6 and alleged that
defendant's maintenance of a website1 7 with a virtually identical
domain name was a deliberate attempt to infringe on plaintiff's mark.
Goods priced in United States dollars could be viewed and purchased
over defendant's website. Shipping and billing addresses were to be
entered into preset formats that were unique to United States mailing
addresses."'
After the commencement of the suit, a disclaimer, "Goods sold only in
the Republic of Ireland," was added to the opening page of the website,
and the prices were changed to Irish pounds." 9 However, the court
noted that the United States remained an option in a pull-down menu
for the entry of shipping and billing information. 2 °
In reviewing defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the court properly noted that the "mere maintenance of an
Internet website is not sufficient activity to exercise general jurisdiction." 21 The court then focused its attention on specific jurisdiction
and appropriately held, albeit with some imprecise language, that
specific personal jurisdiction was proper. 22
The court noted that
defendant regularly attended trade shows in Illinois, maintained
contacts with suppliers in Illinois (in fact, defendant maintained many
of the same suppliers as those
used by plaintiff), and made at least one
2
sale to an Illinois resident. 1
Although the court properly decided the case based on defendant's
cumulative Internet and non-Internet forum contacts, 24 the language
used by the court in Euromarket Designs is problematic and will be
moreso when taken out of context in future cases. The court reviewed
the effects doctrine and held that defendant "allegedly registered an
Illinois company's mark as its domain name and deliberately designed

115. Id.
116. Plaintiff maintained the following website: <http://www.crateandbarrel.com>.
117. Defendant maintained the following website: <http://www.crateandbarrel-ie.com>.
118. 96 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 833.
122. Id.
123. Id at 829.
124. Jurisdiction was based on what the court in Millennium Enterprises categorized
as the jurisdiction of"[i]nteractive Web [s]ites [pilus [nion-Internet [clontacts." 33 F. Supp.
2d at 918.
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an Internet website using an Illinois company's mark [and] intentionally
designed the website to be interactive." 25
Though the court held defendant deliberately designed its site to
infringe the well-known "Crate&Barrel" mark,126 naked infringement
is not at the same level of wrongful conduct as cybersquatting or
intentional defamation absent evidence that the infringement is a
deliberate attempt to use a plaintiff's goodwill, and it may well stand at
the boundary of what constitutes intentional misconduct sufficient to
trigger the effects test. More concerning is the finding of intentional,
tortious conduct necessary to support using the effects test based on the
intent of designing the website to be interactive.' 27 This is simply not
the intent required to justify the use of the effects test, and excerpting
this language in future briefs before other courts will undoubtedly occur.
If this language stands, all websites would subject their makers to
personal jurisdiction under this specific misapplication of the effects test.
The court further took a position other courts have not embraced by
accepting the one demonstrated sale to an Illinois resident. 121 As
noted by the court, the contact was instigated by plaintiff as part of
preparing for litigation.' 9 Compare Millennium Enterprises when the
only sale to the Oregon area by the South Carolina defendant was
instigated by the law firm of a friend of plaintiff's counsel.' 30 Similarly, in Standard Knitting, Ltd. v. Outside Design, Inc.,' the court
found the only sale of the infringing product within the forum occurred
at the instigation of the Canadian plaintiff's lawyers who chose to
litigate in Pennsylvania. 1 2 Finally, in Hockerson-Halberstadt,Inc. v.
CostCo Wholesale Corp.,' the court refused to find contact when the
sole contact to the forum was initiated by plaintiff's attorney.'
In all
three instances the contact was discounted.
The effects test has gained popularity because it allows a court more
latitude to reach website operators not otherwise subject to personal
jurisdiction via the sliding-scale standard. To the extent its use is
tightly limited to (1) directed, intentional conduct that is (2) focused on
the forum, its use might survive constitutional muster. Some degree of

125.

96 F. Supp. 2d at 836.

126. Id.
127.

Id.

128. Id. at 829.
129. Id.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

33 F. Supp. 2d at 909.
No. 00-2288, 2000 WL 804434 (E.D. Penn. June 23, 2000).
Id. at *3.
93 F. Supp. 2d 738 (E.D. La. 2000).
Id. at 742-44.
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prelitigation forum contact, similar to the prelitigation presence in
Calder,is necessary, and the presence should indicate commercial intent
to enter the forum, not mere cyber presence. Absent this judicial
restraint, the unfettered use of the effects test will subject parties to
jurisdiction in every forum wherein their alleged misconduct is felt.
IV.
A.

NEW FRONTIERS IN INTERNET ADJUDICATION

Personal Jurisdictionand New Technology

Numerous areas of Internet interactivity have yet to be addressed by
any court, or perhaps, by any brief to any court. One new technology is
the omnipresent use of cookies, miniature data files transmitted by the
website into the user's computer, ' and whether this will trigger
personal jurisdiction. Certainly the use of this technology will ultimately
figure in the analysis.
Used by website operators to track site usage, these cookies allow the
server to identify individual user data so that when the user revisits a
site, the server can recognize the user as a previous visitor and display
3 6
sites/advertising that caters to the user's previously disclosed tastes.'
Virtually undiscussed by any court,'37 these cookies remain on the
users' computers even after they log off the site. DoubleClick, before
adverse publicity about the plan sent its stock into a free fall, planned
to use the information gained from cookies along with nonanonymous
13 8
logon information to complete marketing profiles on its users.
Regardless, a website's use of cookies could well be argued to meet the
analysis from CompuServe as those files are clearly knowingly and
repeatedly transmitted over the Internet to users' computers for
commercial purposes of the website host. Though the argument would
stretch personal jurisdiction, even a passive website that employs these
files would be argued to be availing itself of the forum.
Similarly unaddressed is whether a user's visit to a website constitutes
purposeful availment of the forum of that website. Like the analysis
above, this matter will almost never be an issue in a contracts setting

135. The Dark Side (visited January 1, 2001) <http://www.cookiecentral.com/dsm.htm>.
136. See Lowell Wilson, Basic Computer Security, 33 MD. B.J. 29, 32 (2000).
137. Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 23 F. Supp. 2d 822 (M.D. Tenn. 1998), rev'd
in part 221 F.3d 884 (6th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that cookie files were not property of the
city and that a person cannot use an Open Records Request to access the file containing
these "miniature cookie files").
138. The DoubleClick website <http://www.doubleclick.net>.
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'
because forum selection clauses are in most commercial contracts. 39

However, in the tort setting, it remains to be seen what results will be
obtained as courts address noncontract-type Internet activities. The case
law that is available generally involves hacking, but it is illustrative of
the analysis to come as Internet usage continues to increase. Some of
the torts individuals may wreak upon websites or other individuals
include stealing e-mail, hacking computer systems, and stealing domain

names. 140
A court in the Northern District of Georgia had no problem finding
specific personal jurisdiction when the defendant allegedly "[ellectronically access[ed] the plaintiff's computer system in Georgia, chang[ed]
passwords, cop[ied] computer files containing proprietary information,
and delet[ed] files in an attempt to conceal their illegal entry into the
plaintiff's computer system.""'
The court specifically stated that
defendants "'should not be permitted to take advantage of modern
technology' via the Internet or other electronic means to 'escape
traditional notions of jurisdiction.' 1 42 Although defendants' actions
would apparently have satisfied the effects test described in Section
III(C) of this Article, it remains to be seen whether that test is adopted
for the standard of individual conduct aimed at foreign websites.
B.

Conflict of Law in Cyberspace

Like so much of the jurisprudence facing Icarian adventurers
departing into cyberspace, what law a court will apply once it decides it
has jurisdiction is also traditionally determined by a system of laws
based on defined, known boundaries. "Intellectual property laws are
territorial and therefore, necessarily at odds with the global nature of
the Internet.""4
"The main objectives of choice of law are (1) to achieve 'maximum
fairness to the parties' and (2) to achieve 'effective implementation and

139. See Caspi v. Microsoft Network, 732 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)
(holding that a forum selection clause in an online member agreement is binding just as
it would have been in a written agreement).
140. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 308 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (referring to The Hacker Quarterly, a magazine with articles on how to accomplish
various Internet torts); YourNetDating,LLC, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 870-7 1, concerning a former
employee who hacked his former employer's website to divert customers to a porn site.
141. Peridyne Tech. Solutions, LLC v. Matheson Fast Freight, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d
1366, 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
142. Id. (quoting Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d at 419).
143. Ben Goodger, Cyberspace-EvaluatingWhat Laws to Follow and How to Limit the
Risk of Unintentionally Violating Foreign Laws, 564 PLI/Pat 321, 324 (1999).
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coordination of state or country policies."'144 The synthesis of traditional law and Internet law, particularly in the trademark arena, will
become more fractious as more courts confront international disputes.
Whether the jurisdiction adheres to the very traditional lex loci approach
to conflict of law'45 or to the "most-significant relationship" test,'4 6
the odds of subjecting foreign defendants to sets of laws that they
neither planned for nor understand have vastly increased in an Internet
age. Due Process demands no less vigilance in this arena because once
a court has decided that a defendant has purposefully availed himself of
the benefits and protections of the laws of the jurisdiction, it is too easy
a step to judge him under those laws. This judicial bootstrapping not
only will have foreign defendants trying to discern what territories
wherein they might be haled before a judge, but will also have them
trying to conduct their activities under both their systems of law and the
foreign jurisdiction's law.
1. LexLoci-Traditional Analysis in Trademark. Most countries
follow lex loci delicti in tort, though they are split as to whether the
place of the act or the place of the harm is used to determine applicable
law. 47 An act of trademark infringement derives from tort law"4
and is thus viewed under lex loci delicti, not the lex loci of the contract.
1 49
The act occurs when the sale of the infringing product occurs,
though the injury arguably occurs where the infringed party is
located. 5 ° When the infringement is the posting of an infringing
mark, the act is committed where the website is created or maintained. 1 ' Although the infringing mark may be viewed everywhere,
this fact does not mean that the infringement occurs everywhere.' 52
Though generally inapplicable in a dispute between two United States
citizens litigating a simple trademark infringement in federal court
where federal law applies, this analysis is applicable in disputes with

144. Burnstein, supra note 10, at 88.
145. Georgia is just such a forum.
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
147. Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants,Mice, and Privacy:InternationalChoice of Law and
the Internet, 32 INT'L LAW 991, 998 (1998).
148. Bath & Body Works, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C-2-99-1190, 2000 WL
1810478, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2000).
149. Id. (citing LSI Ind., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 2d 705, 708 (S.D.

Ohio 1999)).
150. See PanabisionInt'l, LP, 141 F.3d at 1322.
151. TeleByte, Inc. v. Kendaco, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
152. Id. (citing Citigroup, Inc. v. City Holding Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 549, 567 (S.D.N.Y.
2000)).
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foreign defendants and disputes not involving federal law between
domestic parties.
Simply identifying what conflict of law analysis a forum employs is not
sufficient to determine what law will apply. Under lex loci delicti, the
location of the tort applies, but a question arises as to which aspect of
the tort applies. Most fora, including Georgia, determine the loci by
determining where the cause of action arose, which is where the injury
itself or the last thing necessary to sustain the claim occurred. 5 ' In
an injury-based traditional analysis, "[iut is the place where the injury
sustained was suffered rather than the place where the act was
committed.""5 4
When the injury is to a forum plaintiff, this analysis will almost
always result in the forum's law being applied. "Because there is no
single answer to this choice of law problem, the forum will likely apply
its own law to the dispute.""'5 A defamed individual suffers the most
harm in his community, and as identified above, a corporation whose
trademark is infringed suffers the greatest harm in its principal place
of business.'5 6 Thus, a Georgia corporation whose mark is infringed
by a Taiwanese corporation will suffer its greatest harm in Georgia, as
well as the United States. Therefore, Georgia and United States law
will apply.
However, this rigid result, to the extent that it attempts to foist
United States law on a foreign defendant's foreign activities, does not
comport with the admonitions of almost fifty years of international
trademark jurisprudence. In Vanity FairMills, Inc. v. T Eaton Co.," 7
an American (Pennsylvanian) manufacturer brought suit against a
Canadian manufacturer in New York. The Canadian defendant had its
principal office in Toronto, Ontario, but it also had an office in the
Southern District of New York. The Canadian entity had a validly
registered Canadian trademark that infringed on the American
corporation's mark. Vanity Fair Mills brought suit to enjoin the
Canadian's use of the mark both domestically and in Canada.'

153. See Risdon Enters., Inc. v. Colemill Enters., Inc., 172 Ga. App. 902, 903, 324
S.E.2d 738, 740 (1984) (citing Ohio Southern Express Co. v. Beeler, 110 Ga. App. 867, 868,
140 S.E.2d 235, 236 (1965)).
154. Id. (citing 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 12(2)(b) (1967)).
155. Burnstein, supra note 10, at 93 (citing Keeton v. Hustler, 465 U.S. 770 (1984)
(applying New Hampshire law to a nationwide libel)).
156. See PanavisionInt'l Ltd., 141 F.3d at 1322.
157. 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956). This case is a virtual primer on international

trademark disputes.
158. Id. at 636-38.
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The court stated that the result sought, extraterritorial application of
American law, "is contrary to usual conflict-of-laws principles."' 9 The
"exercise of such power is fraught with possibilities of discord and
conflict with the authorities of another country."6 ° The court found
plaintiff's assertion of the International Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property'
unavailing, holding that the International
Convention, a compact between member countries, does not give
extraterritorial application to member's laws. Rather, it binds the
members to enforce their laws equally between foreign and domestic
parties within their own territories. 6 2 While the court could address
United States actions of a foreign defendant and even enjoin the same,
the court held that it should not reach a determination of the validity of
6 3
the foreign mark within the confines of the foreign territory.
2. Significant Relationships-A Slightly Better Approach. In
response to the rigidity of the Restatement (First) of Conflicts' lex loci
approach, the Second Restatement was introduced to consider the place
of the injury, the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
the place of domicile, and the place where the parties' relationship is
centered."6 These contacts were evaluated under weighted factors to
define the forum with which there was the most significant relationship. 65 A court employing this system must consider: (1) the needs
of the interstate or international system; (2) the relevant policies of the
forum; (3) the relevant policies of the interested states or territories; (4)
the expectations of the parties; (5) the state policies underlying the
particular laws; (6) the certainty and uniformity of result in applying 66
a
given law; and (7) the ease in determining and applying the law.
Because so many of the contacts under which jurisdiction becomes
proper are identical to the contacts that are evaluated to determine
which law applies under the most significant relationship test, a finding
of jurisdiction frequently results in the forum court's application of its
own law. Although a foreign defendant has a greater chance of
obtaining judgment under its own laws under the most significant
relationship, this approach does not resolve the problem identified in

159.
160.
161.
53 Stat.
162.

Id. at 638.
Id. at 647.
International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, June 2, 1934,
1748 (1883) (revised 1934, 1967).
234 F.2d at 640.

163. Id. at 646.
164.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

165.

Id. § 6(2).

166. See id.

§ 145(2) (1971).
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Section IV(A) of this Article, namely the extraterritorial application of
United States law to a foreign defendant.
Regardless of which choice of law analysis a court employs, the end
result often puts defendants in the untenable position of both defending
in jurisdictions to which they did not voluntarily submit and deciphering
laws they have never confronted before. Given the current state of
technology, which has not found a filter that can operate from the
website to prevent the access of users in certain territories or countries,'67 fairness, if not judicial discretion, mandates that the website
operators not be held to standards not present within their domicile.
A very recent example of this problem demonstrates the conundrum
facing the website operators. On November 20, 2000, a French judge,
Judge Jean Jacques Gomez, gave Yahoo! three months to find a way to
prevent French users from accessing pages that feature Nazi memorabilia.' 6 Although Yahoo! had removed the offending material from its
French site, the judge further ordered that French users not be able to
access the material on the United States or United Kingdom sites, which
a French user can affirmatively hunt down and access."6 9 Yahoo!
maintains that a complete barrier to these sites concerning Nazis would
be virtually impossible without completely blocking all historical works
about the Second World War.
V.

CONCLUSION

Cyberspace offers a unique capacity to unite the world and to escape
the isolationism courts have staunchly maintained. However, jurisprudence developed under a world defined by arbitrary lines imposed on a
map must evolve in a world interconnected by networked individuals
and businesses lest it "melt the wax from our wings." Though courts
have made great strides in understanding the Internet and better
classifying Internet contacts, the technological evolution is still outpacing
the law. Nevertheless, frustration with the inability of the law to keep
pace will not sanction the use of a test designed solely for deliberate,
intentionally tortious conduct, and the effects test must be judicially
limited to that narrow field. The sliding-scale standard, as refined by

167. Filters are available to the users who may obtain these programs designed to
screen website packets as they download and prevent certain websites with objectionable
language or terms. Examples of these, NetNanny and NetSafe, are installed by the user.
This technology will not work for the website that has no reference word with which to
screen potential users.
168. Yahoo! Ordered to Block Nazi Auction Site, THE INTERNET NEWSLETTER, Vol. 5,
No. 9, Dec. 2000, at 7.
169. See id.
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the court in Millennium Enterprises and other cases, is a very workable
standard to the extent the court's admonition is heeded to consider not
potentialities alone; instead actual (albeit electronic) forum contact must
be required."'
As more international disputes arise, choice-of-law analysis will almost
certainly have to move from lex loci to some significant relationship test,
though it remains to be seen whether the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts will have to be further revised.17 1 What remains to be
determined is which will evolve faster: Whether technology can move to
satisfy territorial-based law (i.e., filters), or whether the law can evolve
to comport with the technological realities that exist today.

170. 33 F. Supp. 2d at 918.
171. See Bruce Posnak, The Restatement (Second): Some Not So Fine Tuning for a
Restatement (Third): A Very Well-Curried Leflar over Reese with Korn on the Side (Or Is
It Cob?), 75 IND. L.J. 561 (2000). The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of
Professor Posnak in the conflict-of-law arena.

